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COMPLETE PREEMPTION AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
TREVOR W. MORRISON†
 
In response to Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 537 (2007). 
 
 
Identifying muddles, messes, and even incoherencies in the Su-
preme Court’s decisions on federal jurisdiction is regrettably easy.  
Rescuing even part of the doctrine from the mire is not.  For that rea-
son and others, Gil Seinfeld’s The Puzzle of Complete Preemption1 merits 
considerable praise.  Professor Seinfeld does an admirable job not 
only of diagnosing the Court’s rather odd and undertheorized doc-
trine of “complete preemption,”2 but also of proposing a way to place 
the doctrine on firmer conceptual footing by shaping it around the 
fundamental goal of uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.  
The result is certainly a better justified account of complete preemp-
tion than can be found in the Court’s cases. 
Sometimes, however, doctrinal reconceptualization exposes even 
more fundamental flaws.  Such is the case with complete preemption.  
Professor Seinfeld certainly does place the doctrine on surer footing 
than where it currently stands, but in so doing he also illuminates an 
ineluctable problem:  any attempt to fashion a rule of complete pre-
emption entails decisions better made by Congress, not the courts. 
In this short response, I first sound some notes of agreement with 
Professor Seinfeld’s critique of complete preemption doctrine.  I then 
turn to his proposed reshaping of the doctrine around an interest in 
what he calls the “regulatory uniformity” of federal law.  Although cer-
tainly more satisfying than the Court’s shallow account, Professor 
Seinfeld’s refashioning seems to raise a number of new difficulties, or 
at least puzzles.  In particular, it appears to invite the federal courts to 
 † Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
1 155 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (2006). 
2 As Professor Seinfeld points out, “undertheorized” doesn’t go far enough.  “[I]n-
deed, the [complete preemption] doctrine does not appear to be predicated on any 
theory of federal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 548. 
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engage in a range of line-drawing exercises to which they may not be 
especially well suited.  Finally, I conclude by suggesting that the diffi-
culties raised by Professor Seinfeld’s version of complete preemption 
point not so much to problems with his particular refashioning of the 
doctrine as to the broader notion that complete preemption should 
depend on congressional intent, not judicial invention. 
I 
As Professor Seinfeld shows,3 both the scope and the theory of 
complete preemption have been largely obscure since its inception in 
1968.4  To be sure, the basic operation of complete preemption has 
always been clear enough:  in cases where it applies, it permits federal 
question-based removal of state-law claims filed in state court.  In ef-
fect, complete preemption operates as an exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule.  Under that longstanding rule, which the 
Court has inferred from the federal question statute, a claim “arises 
under” the Constitution or laws of the United States (and thus satisfies 
the requirements of federal question jurisdiction) 
only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that 
it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.  It is not enough that the 
plaintiff alleges some anticipated [federal] defense to his cause of action 
and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Con-
stitution.
5
Congress has created certain exceptions to this rule,6 and, in effect, 
complete preemption functions as a judicially created exception. 
Yet the Court has refused to cast complete preemption as an ex-
ception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, reflecting, perhaps, a re-
luctance to admit to the judicial creation of such exceptions in the ab-
sence of any expressed legislative intent to do so.  The result is an 
entirely conclusory rationale for the doctrine:  “When the federal 
statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim 
which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded 
in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.”7
3 See Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 549-55 (detailing the confusing Supreme Court case 
history on complete preemption). 
4 The first case decided on the basis of complete preemption was Avco Corp. v. Aero 
Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 
5 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
6 See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484-85 (1999) (dis-
cussing the exception created by the Price-Anderson Act). 
7 Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 
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I agree with Professor Seinfeld that there are many problems with 
this account.  First, it is sheer fiction to say that complete preemption 
does not entail a departure from the well-pleaded complaint rule.  
The cases covered by complete preemption are all filed in state court.  
The complaint seeks relief under state law and typically says nothing 
about federal law.  The basis for removal is the defendant’s assertion 
that the state claim is preempted by federal law.  In an ordinary pre-
emption case, such a defense would not support federal jurisdiction 
precisely because it would not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule.  
Instead, the preemption defense would be litigated in state court.  
Thus, if complete preemption cases are removable, it is because the 
well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply in those cases.  In short, 
the Court’s protestations notwithstanding, complete preemption is 
indeed “a jurisdictional rule that permits the exercise of federal-
question jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant’s presentation of a 
question of federal law.”8  If the doctrine operates as an exception to 
the well-pleaded complaint rule, it ought to be recognized as such. 
Second, until 2003, the Court’s cases provided very little guidance 
as to precisely when a federal statute will be deemed to preempt state 
law so thoroughly that it yields complete preemption.  When, exactly, 
is a state-law claim “in reality based on federal law”?9  As Professor 
Seinfeld describes, it wasn’t until Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson 
that the Court provided a reasonably clear answer:  A state-law claim is 
completely preempted, and thus removable to federal court as arising 
under federal law, when federal law provides the exclusive cause of ac-
tion for plaintiffs who seek relief for the harm alleged.10  The com-
plete preemption inquiry “focuses on whether Congress intended the 
federal cause of action to be exclusive rather than on whether Con-
gress intended that the cause of action be removable.”11  Thus in Bene-
ficial National Bank itself, the Court held that because the National 
Bank Act provides the exclusive cause of action for usury claims 
against national banks, “there is . . . no such thing as a state-law claim 
of usury against a national bank.”12  Any complaint purporting to as-
8 Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 547. 
9 Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 8. 
10 Id.  Following Professor Seinfeld’s lead, see Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 548 n.31, I 
note that I served as a law clerk to Justice Ginsburg during the October 2002 Term, the 
Term during which Beneficial National Bank was decided.  Everything I write here is 
based on publicly available information. 
11 Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 9 n.5. 
12 Id. at 11. 
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sert such a claim “in reality” asserts a federal claim and thus is remov-
able as arising under federal law. 
Beneficial National Bank may have clarified that an exclusive federal 
cause of action is the trigger for complete preemption, but it did not 
explain why.  To say that federal law provides the only cause of action 
in a particular area is to say that state-law claims in that area are pre-
empted.  Yet, as Justice Scalia put it in his dissenting opinion, “[t]he 
proper response to the presentation of a nonexistent claim to a state 
court is dismissal, not the ‘federalize-and-remove’ dance authorized by 
today’s opinion.”13  Complete preemption marks a departure from 
that typical response.  But why?  Why should complete preemption’s 
jurisdictional consequences turn on whether Congress has created an 
exclusive cause of action? 
The Court’s cases do not even attempt to connect this focus on 
exclusive causes of action to either of the fundamental policies of fed-
eral jurisdiction—namely, protecting against potential state court hos-
tility to federal law, and helping to secure uniformity in the interpre-
tation and application of federal law.  Professor Seinfeld, however, 
does examine the potential connection to those interests.  He con-
cludes that the presence or absence of an exclusive federal cause of 
action does not reliably tell us anything about whether either policy is 
implicated with any special force.14  This is a sound conclusion.  In 
particular, the inaptness of Beneficial National Bank’s exclusive cause of 
action test becomes clear when one recognizes that the test privileges 
federal statutes that provide for private enforcement over those that 
rely on direct public enforcement.  A variety of considerations may go 
into Congress’s decision whether to rely on private or public actors 
(or both) to enforce a particular law,15 but there is no reason to con-
clude that the choice of private enforcement invariably reflects a 
heightened concern for the policies underlying federal jurisdiction.  
For the Court to suggest otherwise is particularly puzzling, given its 
suggestion in other contexts that public enforcement may be the prin-
cipal mechanism for effectuating the federal government’s most im-
portant policy aims.16
13 Id. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
14 Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 561-66 (concluding that concerns of uniformity and 
state-court bias do not explain all preemption). 
15 For a general discussion of some of the tradeoffs between public and certain 
kinds of private enforcement, see Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the 
First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 607-18 (2005). 
16 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759 (1999) (suggesting that the case did 
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In sum, the clarity that Beneficial National Bank brought to com-
plete preemption also exposed its theoretical impoverishment.  The 
Court’s emphasis on the presence or absence of an exclusive federal 
private right of action goes entirely unexplained in its opinions and 
bears no meaningful connection to the underlying policies of federal 
jurisdiction.  Complete preemption needs rethinking. 
II 
Professor Seinfeld’s proposed reshaping of the doctrine contains 
four main contentions.  First, the interest in the uniform interpreta-
tion and application of federal law (which Seinfeld subdivides into 
“equal-application uniformity” and “regulatory uniformity”) is more 
germane to this inquiry than is the interest in protecting against state 
courts’ anti-federal law biases.17  Second, the presence of a particularly 
strong interest in regulatory uniformity may be inferred from the ex-
tent to which the relevant federal statute preempts state law:  “the 
more broadly preemptive federal law is, the more likely it is that the 
interest in regulatory uniformity is in play.”18  Third, federal courts are 
likely to interpret the law both correctly and in a way that will advance 
the goals of regulatory uniformity.19  Therefore, fourth, the more 
broadly preemptive a federal statute is, the more inclined we should 
be to assign a jurisdictional consequence to that preemption by allow-
ing defendants invoking the law to remove to federal court.20  Distilled 
to its essence, the argument is that the jurisdictional consequences of 
complete preemption should be a function of the preemptive breadth 
of the federal law in question. 
Were complete preemption doctrine reformulated along these 
lines, it would certainly enjoy a conceptual soundness that it currently 
lacks.  But Professor Seinfeld’s proposal also raises some puzzles of its 
own that are worth considering. 
First, a strong premise in Professor Seinfeld’s argument is that 
federal courts are consistently superior to state courts when it comes 
not implicate a strong federal interest because the federal government had not prose-
cuted the action directly); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney Gen-
eral, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 194 (noting, and criticizing, the Court’s “equation of im-
portance with centralized enforcement”). 
17 Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 573. 
18 Id. at 574. 
19 Id. at 574 & n.115. 
20 Id. at 574. 
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to interpreting federal law uniformly and correctly.21  He is not the 
first to embrace that premise, of course.  Indeed, the academic litera-
ture contains numerous strong arguments against the “myth of parity” 
and in favor of the view that the federal courts are structurally supe-
rior to state courts in the interpretation and enforcement of federal 
law.22  Yet the Constitution’s adoption of the Madisonian Compromise 
(which allows Congress to choose whether to create lower federal 
courts)23 and the fact that Congress did not grant the lower federal 
courts general federal question jurisdiction until 187524 suggest that 
those courts have not always been deemed indispensable to the poli-
cies of federal law.  The point here is not to deny any difference be-
tween the federal and state judiciaries when it comes to the correct 
and uniform interpretation of federal law; it is rather to suggest that 
the extent of the federal courts’ superiority may be historically contin-
gent. 
Moreover, the contingency may be substantive in addition to his-
torical.  Consider in this regard Professor Seinfeld’s own account of 
concerns relating to state-court bias:  “[D]uring any given period, state 
courts might be particularly hostile to civil rights claims, the claims of 
criminal defendants, claims against labor unions, and so on. . . .  [We 
cannot] know[] what sorts of cases will fit into this category as time 
goes on . . . .”25  Professor Seinfeld contrasts this historical and sub-
stantive contingency with the interest in the uniform and correct in-
terpretation of federal law, which he sees as more stable across time.  
But even if the uniformity interest is relatively stable, doesn’t the vari-
ability of state-court bias inevitably yield at least some variability in the 
extent to which access to federal courts is essential to federal uniform-
ity?  In times of heightened state-court bias against certain categories 
of litigants or types of federal laws, there would naturally be a height-
ened concern about state courts’ capacity and inclination to interpret 
federal law in a way that is both correct and conducive to federal uni-
formity.  But at other times and in other areas, state courts may be 
more reliable on this score.  The likelihood of state-court bias at any 
21 Id. at 542 & n.12. 
22 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).  For a 
review of the literature in this area, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered:  Defin-
ing a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988). 
23 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”). 
24 See Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 543 (discussing the 1875 statute). 
25 Id. at 572. 
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particular time and in any particular area, in other words, surely af-
fects the extent to which the federal courts will be better at producing 
correct and uniform interpretations of federal law. 
There may be other variations as well.  Citing the American Law 
Institute’s 1968 Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Fed-
eral Courts, Professor Seinfeld notes that one reason federal judges are 
generally thought to be better at producing federal uniformity is that 
they are presumed to have greater expertise in the interpretation of 
federal law.26  But here too, it seems unlikely that the federal-state dif-
ference would be constant.  Wouldn’t the difference depend in part 
on the complexity of the particular federal statute in question?  And 
wouldn’t it also depend on whether many states have adopted laws es-
sentially modeled on the federal one?  If the federal law is not particu-
larly complex, and if state-court judges in many states are likely to find 
the statute accessible given its similarities to certain state-law analogs, 
then presumably the expertise disparity would be smaller than if we 
were dealing with a unique and highly complicated federal statute. 
To reiterate, I do not deny that federal courts are, on average, bet-
ter situated than state courts to construe federal law in a uniform and 
correct fashion.  Rather, my point is that the extent of the difference 
between state and federal courts may well be historically and substan-
tively contingent.  If so, then a crucial premise of Professor Seinfeld’s 
argument is somewhat weakened.  If the federal courts’ superior ca-
pacity to produce federal uniformity is variable, then the removability 
of state-law claims that implicate federal statutes should perhaps not 
simply be a function of the federal statute’s preemptive breadth.  In 
some areas and at some times, state courts may be perfectly adequate 
to the task of dismissing state-law claims on the basis of federal pre-
emption defenses.  Indeed, that may be particularly so in Professor 
Seinfeld’s paradigm case for complete preemption, where the federal 
statute that the defendant invokes is broadly field-preemptive of state 
law.  If a federal statute’s field-preemptive sweep is sufficiently broad, 
even relatively inexpert state courts may have little difficulty determin-
ing, correctly, that all state laws in the area are preempted and that 
claims under those state laws must be dismissed. 
Finally, and separately, it is worth noting that if the Court were to 
adopt Professor Seinfeld’s approach, the instances of complete pre-
emption would almost surely increase.  To be sure, as Professor Sein-
feld sensibly acknowledges, it might be difficult under his approach to 
26 Id. at 542 n.12. 
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“distinguish[] those federal statutes that are so robustly preemptive as 
to merit special jurisdictional treatment from those that are not.”27  
But at the very least, removal would be proper in every state case in 
which the defendant invokes a field-preemptive federal statute.  The 
Court’s current doctrine, in contrast, permits removal only when the 
defendant relies on a preemptive federal statute that also provides an 
exclusive private right of action.  The latter is surely a smaller set of 
cases than the former.  As the Solicitor General noted during the Bene-
ficial National Bank litigation, “[f]ield preemption is relatively rare.  It 
occurs only when displacement of state law is ‘the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.’  And field preemption accomplished through 
the provision of a federal cause of action is rarer still.”28
In other words, even if Professor Seinfeld’s proposal were limited 
to field-preemptive statutes (and, as he explains, it is not29), it would 
still permit removal in more cases than current doctrine allows.  Of 
course, this alone does not undermine Professor Seinfeld’s argument.  
But it does suggest caution, especially where, as here, federal jurisdic-
tion is predicated entirely on judge-made doctrine.  Indeed, in the 
next Part I will suggest that decisions of this sort would be much bet-
ter made by Congress, not the courts. 
III 
It is a commonplace that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited ju-
risdiction.  They possess only that power authorized by Constitution 
and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”30  That 
separation of powers principle strains under the weight of complete 
preemption, which, as Ernest Young puts it, is “wholly [a] product[] 
of the judicial imagination.”31  More specifically, complete preemp-
tion functions as a judicially created exception to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, which has long been understood to be included in the 
27 Id. at 579. 
28 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Bene-
ficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (No. 02-306), 2003 WL 1098993 (in-
ternal citation omitted) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947)). 
29 Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 576. 
30 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal 
citation omitted). 
31 Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti:  Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Re-
moval, and Complete Preemption 15 (Oct. 25, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the author). 
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language of the general federal question statute.  Congress could 
surely enact such an exception to that rule, permitting removal on the 
basis of certain federal defenses.  Congress could even abandon the 
well-pleaded complaint rule across the board.  But in the absence of 
any such congressional action, the wholly judge-made doctrine of 
complete preemption chafes with the rule that federal jurisdiction is 
“not to be expanded by judicial decree.”32
Professor Seinfeld’s reconceptualization of complete preemption 
does not cure these separation of powers concerns, nor does it pur-
port to do so.  Instead, he reasons that since the Supreme Court has 
shown no inclination to abandon complete preemption doctrine, it is 
worth asking how the doctrine might be most sensibly maintained and 
reformed.33  That is a perfectly worthy undertaking.  And it has its re-
wards.  As noted above, the doctrinal reformulation proposed by Pro-
fessor Seinfeld is much more conceptually sound than the Court’s 
current doctrine. 
Yet at the same time, Professor Seinfeld’s reformulation highlights 
some of the reasons why the existence and scope of preemption-based 
removal is best left to Congress.  As discussed above, the need for this 
sort of removal to ensure regulatory uniformity seems both historically 
and substantively contingent.  Assessing the need in any particular 
area requires factfinding and balancing.  The question is not simply 
whether federal courts are typically better than state courts at inter-
preting federal law, but how much better they are in certain areas and 
during certain times, and whether the extent of their superiority justi-
fies the costs associated with a heavier federal caseload.  Courts are ill-
suited to perform this sort of policy-based balancing.  Congress, in 
contrast, is well suited to the task.  Thus, in addition to the formal 
point that federal courts are not empowered to expand the bounda-
ries of their own jurisdiction, there is a functional argument that Con-
gress is simply better than the courts at making the kinds of decisions 
necessary to craft sensible and coherent doctrine in this area.34
32 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. 
33 Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 571. 
34 Justice Scalia may have been making this very point in his Beneficial National 
Bank dissent, in which he stressed that “it is up to Congress, not the federal courts, to 
decide when the risk of state-court error with respect to a matter of federal law be-
comes so unbearable as to justify divesting the state courts of authority to decide the 
federal matter.”  Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 21 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
  
2007] COMPLETE PREEMPTION  195 
In sum, though there is considerable merit in Professor Seinfeld’s 
reformulated doctrine of complete preemption, the hope should be 
that Congress will take his reformulation up as a legislative matter, not 
that the Court will impose it by decree. 
 
